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endogenous growth: utility of agents in developing countries is a¤ected by con-
sumption gaps with the average consumer in advanced economies. By distorting
terms of trade, status seeking: (i) may compensate for structural gaps in physical
productivity, inducing convergence; (ii) may revert the link between trade and
growth; and (iii) induces divergence when interacting with technological catching-
up. In particular, envy in conjunction with catching-up predicts switchovers of
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leader in the short run, convergence in interest rates - e.g. due to R&D spillovers
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1 Introduction
Capital sin or spirit of capitalism? Despite many censorious denitions, envy is a pow-
erful economic incentive. Economists have long understood that human behaviour is
crucially driven by the subjective perception of social status (Veblen, 1899), and there
is strong empirical evidence that individuals form such perceptions on the basis of in-
terpersonal comparisons (Frank, 1997). In particular, status-seeking behavior has been
regarded as a major ingredient of the spirit of capitalism, as it represents an additional
motive for acquiring goods, beyond the purely physicalbenet that consumption actu-
ally provides (Cole et al. 1992; Bakshi and Chen, 1996). These considerations inspired
early consumption theories in arguing that consumption choices are a¤ected by the
willingness to catch up on the social scale (Duesenberry, 1949). More recently, the
theory of comparison utility gave explicit microfoundations to aggregate models where
saving rates depend on relative, rather than absolute consumption levels. The growing
body of literature on outward-looking preferences (Carrol et al. 1997) shows that
when intertemporal choices embody some degree of status desire the long-run growth
rate of the economy is modied (Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2004), and the economy
may display dynamic ine¢ ciency due to overaccumulation of capital (Alonso-Carrera
et al. 2004). In this literature, social status phenomena are essentially consumption
externalities that drive the economy away from the socially optimal equilibrium: as
shown by Dupor and Liu (2003), the laissez-faire equilibrium in the presence of jeal-
ousyimplies that agents overconsume with respect to the Pareto-optimal equilibrium.
Further distorsions induced by envy arise in the economy when utility is also a¤ected
by leisure, as in the optimal growth models with endogenous labor supply employed
by Liu and Turnovsky (2005) and Alvarez-Cuadrado (2006).
It can be stressed that all contributions mentioned above assume within-country
spillovers - that is, agents evaluate their status on the basis of the average consumption
level of the economy in which they live. It is however plausible that, nowadays, status
seeking phenomena also operate at the international level. One may recognize this
as an aspect of globalization, i.e. a large-scale integration process which reshapes
individual behavior by giving consumers new neighborsto look at, and to compare
with. There is substantial evidence that information delivered by global mass media
and marketing activities of multinational rms, as well as tourism and migration, a¤ect
consumption patterns of developing countries by creating a foreign benchmark that
fuels consumersexpectations and desires - see James (2000). As pointed out by Sklair
(1991), the status-leader role played by western economies appears strenghtened by the
fact that consumers in developing countries perceive commodities produced in advanced
economies as positional goods - that is, status-signalling devices. Developments in
Central and Eastern Europe countries after the end of the Cold War, or in China and
India in recent years, provide a wealth of anedoctal evidence conrming this desire to
have what they have(e.g. Friedman, 2000). Moreover, taking into account unequal
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distribution of income within countries, the importance of status consumption is not
conned to high-income classes of emerging economies - i.e. those who can a¤ord a
living standard comparable to the average consumer in advanced economies - since
status desire directed towards positional goods is typically observed in low-income
classes as well (Caplovitz, 1967; Belk, 1988). In other words, international consumption
externalities exist, inuence consumption behavior at the economy level, and likely have
macroeconomic consequences.
From a general equilibrium perspective, transboundary envy - or equivalently, in-
ternational status seeking - may have relevant implications for the development path
followed by open economies, since growth rates are a¤ected by consumption dynamics
through the relative prices of traded goods. However, as noted above, a formal treat-
ment of international status seeking is absent in the existing literature, where pref-
erences are assumed to be interdependent among compatriots.1 This paper analyzes
Catching-UpWith The Jonesesphenomena occurring between trading economies, and
investigates its consequences for terms of trade and growth di¤erentials. The world
consists of two countries, the status leader and the status seeker, that produce hetero-
geneous goods. Consumption in the status-leader country represents the benchmark
standard of livingfor agents living in the less advanced (but developing) economy.
Growth di¤erentials depend on terms of trade e¤ects, which are in turn modied by
envy: as shown in section 2, consumption expenditure in the status-seeking economy
grows, ceteris paribus, at higher rates. The dynamic increase in the relative foreign
demand for the good produced by the status leader, in turn, inates its relative price
on the world market.
This general result is exploited to address a central topic in trade theory: the exis-
tence of structural gaps between trading economies, and the possible mechanisms lead-
ing to international convergence in growth rates. Sections 3 and 4 analyze two models
of endogenous growth where standard convergence results are crucially modied by the
presence of envy. In the literature on trade between asymmetric countries, structural
gaps - i.e. international di¤erences in the rates of physical productivity growth - are
considered a major source of cross-country income di¤erences (Rebelo, 1991) and in-
ternational divergence (Feenstra, 1996). Section 3 develops a simple learning-by-doing
model with status seeking, and shows that terms-of-trade e¤ects generated by envy (i)
may compensate for structural gaps and induce convergence, or even (ii) revert the link
between trade and growth if the degree of status desire is su¢ ciently high. On the one
hand, the possibility of envy-induced convergence is interesting in itself, since we ob-
1In addition to the literature on Catching-Up With Jonesesquoted above, a number of contri-
butions formalized social status in terms of relative wealth (Corneo and Jeanne, 1997; Futagami and
Shibata, 1998). Fisher (2005) and Fisher and Hof (2005) apply the relative wealth approach to open-
economy models, but again assume intra-national status seeking: both papers consider a small-open
economy where the benchmark level of wealth is the average level that agents observe in their own
country.
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tain constant market shares in the absence of the technological links that are typically
required to obtain convergence - i.e. knowledge spillovers (Grossman and Helpman,
1991), ows of ideas (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991), technology di¤usion (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 1997), trade in intermediate inputs (Acemoglu and Ventura, 2002). On
the other hand, the relevance of envy for long-run dynamics raises the question of the
interaction between status seeking and technological catching-up. The issue is tack-
led in section 4 by integrating status desire and catching-up in R&D productivity in
the two-country model of horizontal innovations (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1997). The status leader is also technological leader, by virtue of a
comparative advantage in R&D sectors, whereas the status seeker is also technological
follower. First, it is shown that, for any positive degree of status desire, the two coun-
tries diverge: technological catching-up implies interest rate equalization, but status
desire still distorts terms-of-trade dynamics, driving market shares away from station-
ary equilibria. Second, if the status-and-technology leader is also growth leader in the
short run, the model predicts a switchover of growth leadership in nite time: due to
the interaction between R&D spillovers and status desire, the initially lagging economy
becomes growth leader in the medium run, and exhibits ever-increasing market shares
from that point onwards. The implications of these results are discussed with the main
conclusions in section 5.
2 International status seeking
A central element of Veblens theory of conspicuous consumption is the observation
that individual behavior is driven by the perception of social status: beyond the ma-
terial benet that commodities provide, consumption demand is inuenced by "the
stimulus of an invidious comparison which prompts us to outdo those with whom
we are in the habit of classing ourselves" (Veblen, 1899, p.103). A similar reasoning
underlies the modern theory of comparison utility, according to which individuals dis-
play outward-looking preferences: personal satisfaction depends on the observed gap
between agents consumption and the social benchmark, usually represented by the
average consumption level of the economy (Carrol et al. 1997; Dupor and Liu, 2003).
In a closed-economy context, intertemporal choices are a¤ected by Catching-Up With
The Joneses: wealth accumulation depends on relative consumption levels, and agents
tend to overconsume with respect to the standard optimal growth model with status-
independent preferences (Alonso-Carrera et al. 2004; Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2004).
This literature assumes that preferences are interdependent among agents living in the
same economy. Building on the idea that psychological benchmarks can be provided by
consumption levels in foreign countries, this section formalizes the Catching-Up With
The Jonesesphenomenon as an international externality between trading economies.
In order to provide a general framework for studying the consequences of international
status seeking, we begin by describing consumers behavior in a two-country world,
4
abstracting from technological specications.
2.1 Intertemporal choices in a two-country world
Time is continuous and indexed by t 2 [0;1). The instantaneous variation of variable
x is denoted by _x = dx=dt, and its growth rate by x^ = _x=x. The world comprises
two countries - or economic areas - indexed by i = a; b, specialized in producing het-
erogeneous goods.2 A rst country, the status-leader, produces good a, and a second
country, labelled as the status-seeker, produces good b. Trade allows consumers in
each country to enjoy both goods. Population Ni is constant in both economies, and
agents are homogeneous within each country. The consumption index is denoted by i,
and is represented by a composite good which combines the two commodities available
in the world. Denoting by cji the quantity of good j consumed by agents in country i,
per capita imports in country i are represented by cji with j 6= i. Assuming a constant
elasticity of substitution between traded goods,  > 0, the consumption index reads
i =
h
(1=2) (cai )
 1
 + (1=2)
 
cbi
 1

i 
 1
;  6= 1: (1)
When  < 1, traded goods are perceived as complements, whereas  > 1 implies that
agents treat goods as substitutes. Individual consumption expenditure, expressed in
terms of output produced in country i, is denoted by ci. Denoting by pa and pb the
relative prices of the respective goods, the expenditure constraint reads
pici = pac
a
i + pbc
b
i : (2)
The instantaneous utility functions are specied as
ua (a) =
1 a   1
1   ; (3)
ub (b; ) =
 
b=

1    1
1   ; (4)
where   < 0 is the elasticity of marginal utility. Preferences (3) are standard, and
postulate that satisfaction of consumers in country a only depends on own consumption,
a. Preferences (4), instead, comply with the specications adopted in the literature
on comparison utility(Carrol et al. 1997). In general,  is a psychological benchmark
level by which consumers evaluate their status: utility depends on a weighted ratio
between own consumption, b, and the reference level , and the importance of status
2Originally, two-country models were considered the natural environment for analyzing the e¤ects
of trade in the Heckscher-Ohlin framework (for a recent result, see Fujiwara and Shimomura, 2005).
A di¤erent perspective is taken by the literature on trade and endogenous growth, which focuses on
cross-country di¤erences in income levels and convergence in growth rates - see section 2.2.
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in individual satisfaction is parametrized by , which is the degree of status desire:
if  ! 0, benchmark levels are no longer important for consumers utility, and (4)
reduces to the standard form as in preferences (3). In the closed-economy setting,
similar benchmark preferences have been used to describe two related phenomena, habit
formation and Catching-Up with the Joneses(Carrol et al. 1997; Alonso-Carrera et
al. 2004; Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 2004). In the former case,  is the weighted average
of past consumption indices of the same agent. In the latter case,  is the average level
of consumption within the economy in which the representative agent operates.
This paper considers relative consumption in a di¤erent context by formalizing
asymmetric preferences between trading countries. In particular, consumersbehavior
in economy b is driven by international status seeking. The underlying logic is that
agents in emerging economies aim at achieving the living standards exhibited by con-
sumers of more advanced economies. Formally, we assume  = a, with 0   < 1 and
 > 1. Setting  = a, utility in country b is a¤ected by consumption gaps with the
status leader: instantaneous satisfaction reads ub (b; ) = ub (b; a), where foreign
consumption a is taken as given. Envy arises when  > 0, which implies @ub=@a < 0:
an increase in the benchmark level decreases utility. Another important restriction
is that the elasticity parameter  is assumed to exceed unity. Setting  > 1 implies
that the cross derivative @2ub= (@b@a) be strictly positive: a marginal increase in
consumption of country a increases the marginal utility (from own consumption) of
agents in country b. This guarantees that agents in country b display Catching-Up
with the Jonesesbehavior (Dupor and Liu, 2003). In the present context, an increase
in the benchmark level stimulates the willingness of country bs residents to consume
more in order to cath-up with the status leader.3
Following a standard procedure (e.g. Frenkel and Razin, 1985; Gardner and Kim-
brough, 1990), the consumer problem is solved in two steps. First, each agent chooses
how to allocate consumption expenditures between the two goods by maximizing ui
subject to (2), using cai and c
b
i as control variables and taking expenditure ci as given.
Dening the terms-of-trade index as p  pb=pa, rst-step optimality conditions imply
cai = c
b
ip
 (5)
in both countries. Substituting (5) in (1)-(2), equilibrium consumption indices are
a (ca; p) = (ca=p)  (p) and 

b (cb; p) = cb (p) ; (6)
where we have dened
 (p)  (1=2)  1  1 + p 1 1 1 : (7)
3As pointed out by Alonso-Carrera et al. (2004), the restriction  > 1 is relevant because it guar-
antees an interior solution to the intertemporal maximization problem in the presence of consumption
externalities.
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Substituting (6) in (3)-(4) gives the indirect utility functions
ua (ca; p) = ua (

a (ca; p)) and u

b (cb; p; ) = ub (

b (cb; p) ; )
where the price index is taken as given by each consumer, and benchmark levels  =
a (ca; p) are taken as given by agents in country b. In the second step, agents choose the
sequence of consumption expenditures {ci (t)}10 that maximizes the objective functionZ 1
0
ui (ci (t)) e
 tdt; (8)
where  > 0 is the utility discount rate. Objective (8) is maximized subject to the
dynamic wealth constraint
_qi (t) = ri (t) qi (t) + wi (t) `i (t)  ci (t) ; (9)
where all variables are expressed in terms of output produced in country i. Private
wealth per capita qi is held in the form of assets yielding a rate of return equal to
ri, and labor income equals the wage rate wi times units of labor e¢ ciency supplied,
`i. Denoting by a and b the dynamic multipliers associated with constraint (9),
optimality conditions of the second-step problem imply
^a =   ra and a = c a  1 p 1; (10)
^b =   rb and b = c b  (1 )(1 )p(1 )c( 1)a : (11)
Time-di¤erentiating a and b and substituting in the respective co-state equations
gives
c^a = 
 1 [Ra + (   1) (1   p) p^] ; (12)
c^b = 
 1 [Rb + (1  ) (1  )  pp^+  (1  ) p^   (1  ) c^a] ; (13)
where we have dened net interest rates as Ri  ri   , and  p  @=@p. From (12)-
(13), consumption dynamics in both countries are inuenced by terms of trade e¤ects,
through  p and p^.4 In particular, expression (13) shows that, for any positive degree
of status desire , the growth rate of consumption expenditure in country b is directly
a¤ected by consumption expenditure in country a, by virtue of transboundary envy.
Ruling out international mobility of assets, balanced trade in each point in time
requires that p^ be proportional to the di¤erential in expenditure growth rates,5
p^ =  1 (c^a   c^b) : (14)
4Terms-of-trade e¤ects in (12)-(13) vanish as  ! 1. In this case, utility becomes logarithmic and
the growth rates of consumption expenditures in both countries obey the standard Keynes-Ramsey
rule, c^i = Ri. The logarithmic case, however, is not interesting for the aim of the present analysis,
since  ! 1 would imply that consumers in country b do not display Catching-Up with the Joneses
behavior.
5Trade balance requires that the value of aggregate imports in country a match that of aggregate
imports in country b - that is, pbcbaNa = pac
a
bNb. Substituting this condition in (5) and (2) gives
p = (caNa) = (cbNb), which yields (14) after straightforward time-di¤erentiation.
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Substituting (12)-(13) in (14), the growth rate of the price index along the equilibrium
path reads
p^ =
Ra  Rb   (=) (   1)Ra
   (   1) [1 + (=) (1   p)] : (15)
Note that setting  = 0, we obtain the growth rate of the price index without envy,
p^f  Ra  Rb
   (   1) ; (16)
where superscript f is used to denote results obtained in the status-freemodel. Com-
paring (15) with (16), the e¤ect of envy on the dynamics of terms of trade is twofold.
On the one hand, envy imposes a wedge between terms-of-trade e¤ects and the interest
rate di¤erential, Ra   Rb: this interest-rate e¤ect, represented by the last term in the
numerator of (15), is the source of the main results of our analysis. On the other hand,
status desire induces an elasticity e¤ect represented by the square brackets in the de-
nominator of (15):  modies the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and, hence,
the magnitude of p^ in response to a given interest rate di¤erential. In this regard, the
price elasticity can be denoted as
 (t)  1
   (   1) [1 + (=) (1   p (t))] : (17)
A su¢ cient condition to rule out the degenerate case of a negative price elasticity is

   1 [1 +  (   1)] > ; (18)
which ensures case  (t) > 0 at each point in time. Since  > 1 and  < 1, condition
(18) is easily met for a wide range of parameters (in particular, it is necessarily satised
when traded goods are substitutes,  > 1) and is assumed to hold throughout the rest
of the paper.6
Expression (15) provides the basis for the main results of the present analysis: for
given interest rates, status desire determines both the magnitude and the direction of
terms-of-trade e¤ects, by inuencing the absolute value and the sign of p^. In particular,
the price distorsion represented by the term (=) (   1)Ra may be high enough to
revert the sign of p^ with respect to the status-free case - see (16). The possibility that
p^ < 0 due to status seeking has an intuitive interpretation: ceteris paribus, status
seeking boosts consumption expenditures in country b, implying a dynamic increase
in the relative demand for good a. This process inates the relative price of the good
produced in the status-leader economy, driving down the price ratio, p = pb=pa, over
6Related literature ignores similar restrictions since the vast majority of two-country models as-
sumes logarithmic intertemporal utility,  = 1. In this case, the price elasticity  = 1= is, by
construction, constant and strictly positive. See e.g. Frenkel and Razin (1985) and Feenstra (1996).
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time. Obviously, the consequences of status seeking for growth di¤erentials can be
assessed only by making further assumptions regarding technologies and accumulation
processes. Sections 3 and 4 apply this framework to standard models of endogenous
growth. Below, we give formal denitions of growth di¤erentials and a brief summary
of established results in the literature on growth and international convergence.
2.2 Structural gaps and international convergence
In the early Nineties, the vast empirical evidence documenting cross-country di¤er-
ences in income levels stimulated a huge literature on international trade and economic
growth. Two widely accepted empirical ndings are: (i) cross-country gaps in pro-
ductivity and income per capita are huge and persistent, and (ii) the rate of conver-
gence between countries is limited, with estimated value around two per cent (Temple,
1999; Acemoglu and Ventura, 2002; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Cross-country
di¤erences in income levels have been primarily explained in terms of asymmetric tech-
nologies that, in an endogenous-growth framework, may generate income gaps even if
economies converge in growth rates. In this regard, a central result of this literature is
that convergence in growth rates obtains when backward countries share some of the
technological improvements of advanced economies - e.g. through knowledge spillovers
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991), ows of ideas (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991), tech-
nology di¤usion (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997), or trade in intermediate inputs (Ace-
moglu and Ventura, 2002). If none of these opportunities for technical improvement is
accessible to lagging countries, structural di¤erences in physical-productivity growth
rates - structural gaps, henceforth - translate into persistent di¤erences in growth rates
(Rebelo, 1991), and market shares diverge despite free trade in nal goods (Feenstra,
1996).
The situation in which the production possibility frontier of lagging countries is not
improved by external factors can be labelled as technological independence - a broad
denition including the absence of trade in intermediate inputs. The link between tech-
nological independence and diverging market shares is formally described as follows:
denote by Yi aggregate physical output in country i, and dene the growth di¤erential
between economies a and b as   p^a + Y^a   p^b   Y^b. The dynamics of the shares of
the two countries in the world market are exclusively determined by the sign of the
growth di¤erential, since  > 0 ( < 0) implies that the value of output of country a
increases (decreases) relative to world output. The degree of divergence, in turn, can
be indexed by the absolute value of the growth di¤erential, jj. Denoting aggregate
consumption expenditure by Ci = Nici, we can substitute (14) to rewrite the growth
di¤erential as
 = y   p^ = y    1c; (19)
where y  Y^a  Y^b represents the physical-output e¤ect, and the terms-of-trade e¤ect,
p^, is proportional to the di¤erential in consumption growth rates, c  C^a   C^b. It
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follows from (19) that, if each country converges to a balanced growth equilibrium at
least in the long run, Y^i ! C^i implies
lim
t!1
(t) = lim
t!1
(   1) 1y = lim
t!1
(   1) p^: (20)
In the presence of structural gaps, Y^a 6= Y^b also in the long run and the growth di¤er-
ential (20) di¤ers from zero: the physical-output e¤ect dominates if traded goods are
perceived as substitutes ( > 1), whereas terms-of-trade e¤ects dominate when traded
goods are perceived as complements ( < 1).
3 Trade, Envy and Structural Gaps
The logic behind models with structural gaps is that barriers to knoweldge and tech-
nology di¤usion prevent trading economies from achieving uniform growth rates. The
e¤ects of status seeking in this context can be analyzed in a simple manner by assum-
ing linear returns to aggregate capital. The model presented in section 3.1 features
learning-by-doing, and can be considered a two-country version of Romer (1989) - see
also Rebelo (1991) and Young (1991) - extended to include heterogeneous goods and
international status seeking.
3.1 Status seeking and learning-by-doing
In each country there are J identical rms, indexed by j, that produce yi;j units of
nal good i by employing ki;j units of capital and `i;j units of labor e¢ ciency. Each
rms technology is represented by yi;j = F i (ki;j; `i;j), with F i : <2 ! < homogeneous
of degree one, twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave
and satisfying Inada conditions. Labor is supplied inelastically and is immobile at
the international level. Normalizing work time to unity, e¢ cient labor individually
supplied, `i, is proportional to human knowledge, hi, according to the relation `i = ihi,
where i is a constant country-specic proportionality factor. The engine of growth
is knowledge accumulation due to learning-by-doing: workersknowledge is a¤ected
by an aggregated externality, which is taken as given by rms. In the competitive
equilibrium, factor prices equal marginal productivities dened at given externalities:
ri = F
i
1 (kij; `ij) and wi = F
i
2 (kij; `ij) ; (21)
where F i1 and F
i
2 are partial derivatives with respect to the rst and second argument,
respectively. Since rms are of identical size, they employ identical amounts of inputs
and produce the same output level yij = yi. Aggregate output Yi = Jyi thus equals
Yi = F
i (Ki; Li), where Ki = Jki is aggregate capital and Li = J`i = ihiNi is
aggregate e¢ cient labor. Following Romer (1989), we assume that hi is positvely
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related with the aggregate capital stockKi: assuming hi (t) = BiKi (t), constant Bi > 0
represents the intensity of learning-by-doing. Substituting this relation in the aggregate
production function we obtain
Yi = AiKi; (22)
where the marginal social return from capital, Ai  F i (1; iBiNi), is constant over
time. The marginal private return from capital, instead, equals the equilibrium interest
rate
ri = Ai   wi iBiNi < Ai; (23)
where wi = F
i
2 (1; iBiNi) is constant as well.
7 In order to have positive net interest
rates, parameters must be such that Ai   iBiNi > . Using (23), it derives that the
numerator in (15) is constant. As shown in the Appendix, this implies that the growth
rate of the price index is constant (at least) in the long run:
Proposition 1 If  = 2, then  p = 0:25 at each instant, the price elasticity  = ~ is
constant, and
p^ (t) = ~ [Ra  Rb   (=) (   1)Ra] for all t 2 [0;1) ; (24)
where ~ = 2  (   1) [1 + (=) (0:75)] > 0. If  6= 2, then  p and  converge to nite
steady-state values  p and 
, and
lim
t!1
p^ (t) =  [Ra  Rb   (=) (   1)Ra] : (25)
Proposition 1 shows that distortions induced by status seeking persist in the long
run. The consequences for growth di¤erentials and market shares are as follows. Since
individual wealth equals domestic capital per capita, qi = Ki=Ni, the dynamic law (9)
implies the standard aggregate constraint _Ki = Yi   Ci, from which
Y^i = K^i = Ai   (Ci=Ki) (26)
at each point in time. Recalling that p^ and  p are both constant at least in the long
run, optimality conditions (12)-(13) imply that C^a and C^b are asymptotically constant
as well: the unique equilibrium compatible with (26) and intertemporal optimality
conditions features balanced growth,
lim
t!1
Y^i = lim
t!1
K^i = lim
t!1
C^i (i = a; b) ;
7Substituting hi = BiKi in prot-maximizing conditions (21) we have constant interest and wage
rates, ri = F
i
1 (1; iBiNi) and w

i = F
i
2 (1; iBiNi). By Eulers Theorem, output is distributed
according to Yi = riKi +wiLi, which can be rewritten as AiKi = riKi +wi iBiNiKi and solved for
ri to obtain (23).
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which implies y = c asymptotically. Using (19), (24) and (25), we obtain
(t) = ~ (   1) [Ra  Rb   (=) (   1)Ra] if  = 2; (27)
lim
t!1
(t) =  (   1) [Ra  Rb   (=) (   1)Ra] if  6= 2; (28)
where (27) is valid at each point in time. The comparison between (27)-(28) and the
status-free case,
f = f (   1) (Ra  Rb) ; (29)
is now straightforward.8 Consider the assumption Ra > Rb as the benchmark case.
In the pure model without envy, this structural gap implies that physical productivity
growth is higher in country a, which increases (decreases) its market share at the
expense (in favor) of country bs share if the two goods are perceived as substitutes
(complements). In view of this premise, the implications of envy are substantial:
Proposition 2 When Ra > Rb, there exists a critical level of status desire
 =
Ra  Rb
Ra


   1

(30)
such that: (i) if  =  then limt!1(t) = 0; (ii) if  > , the sign of the long-run
growth di¤erential is overturned by envy.
Proposition 2 asserts that status seeking inuences the link between trade and
growth, and reverts the growth di¤erential between the two economies if the degree
of status desire is su¢ ciently high. Result (i) shows that growth rates converge in
the long run if  equals the critical level (30), despite the fact that the two economies
are technologically independent: knowledge spillovers are absent, no trade in inputs
occurs, and technology di¤usion is ruled out by assumption. Situation (i) thus describes
convergence induced by envy, where constant market shares are exclusively due to
international status-seeking. Result (ii) is to some extent stronger: if  > , envy
overturns the sign of the growth di¤erential. In particular, when traded goods are
perceived as substitutes,  > 1, status seeking reverts the growth di¤erential in favor
of economy b, against the status leader.
3.2 Other environments with structural gaps
The previous results can be generalized to a wider class of endogenous growth models.
Propositions 1 and 2 are robust to alternative specications of the supply-side of the
economy as long as the long run equilibrium features balanced growth and the time-
path of net interest rates complies with minimal conditions of regularity. Denoting by
Rx the numerator in the right hand side of (15), the following result holds:
8From (17), in the status-free case  = 0 the price elasticity does not depend on p and is therefore
constant, f = [1 +  (   1)] 1. As a consequence, the growth di¤erential in the learning-by-doing
model with structural gaps is constant and equal to (29) at each point in time.
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Lemma 3 Suppose that, for all t 2 [t0;1) with t0  0, we have either Rx (t) > 0 or
Rx (t) < 0. Then,  p eventually converges to a nite steady-state  p - which is either
zero or (1=2)

 1 , depending on parameters - and the price elasticity  is asymptotically
constant. Hence, if both economies achieve balanced growth in the long run, Proposition
2 holds true.
Lemma 3 is proved in the Appendix without making any assumption about tech-
nology and accumulation processes of knowledge and individual wealth. The only
hypotheses are convergence to balanced growth within each country, and no cyclical
switchovers in the sign of Rx from some point in time onwards. As a consequence, the
same results derived in Proposition 2 can be obtained in more sophisticated models
where economies have a multi-sectoral structure and the engine of growth is di¤erent
- e.g. human capital formation, gains from specialization, R&D sectors, or vertical
innovations. An immediate example is the expanding-varieties model presented in the
section 4.1, which is extended to include the interaction between status seeking and
technological catching-up.
4 Envy and Technological Catching-Up
If the lagging country exhibits technological catching-up induced by knowledge spillovers
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991), trade in intermediate inputs (Acemoglu and Ventura,
2002), imitation (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1997) or ows of ideas (Rivera-Batiz and
Romer, 1991), structural gaps may disappear in the long run. Without status-seeking,
technological catching-up implies convergence in growth rates. This section shows that,
as long as technological catching-up implies interest rate equalization, the presence of
status seeking distorts terms of trade and makes the two economies diverge in the
long run. This result is derived using the expanding-varieties model, employed in a
two-country setting by Grossman and Helpman (1990), Feenstra (1996) and Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1997).
4.1 The expanding-varieties model
The structure of the supply side of the economy follows Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997).
Human knowledge is normalized to unity (`i = i), and aggregate labor is in xed
proportion with population, Li = iNi = `iNi. A competitive nal sector produces Yi
by means of labor and a continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods, xi (s) with
mass gi. The aggregate production function is
Yi = L
1 i
i
Z gi
0
xi (s)
i ds: (31)
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Each variety of intermediates, xi (s), is produced with unit production cost by a mo-
nopolist who holds the relevant patent ans sells it to nal rms at price pxi (s). The
demand schedule of nal producers is taken as given by monopolists, who maximize
instantaneous prots i (s) = (pxi (s)  1)xi (s) by setting a constant mark-up over
marginal cost. Equilibrium prices and quantities are invariant across di¤erent types of
intermediates, with pxi (s) = 1= and
xi (s) = 
2
1 i
i Li for any s 2 (0; gi] : (32)
From (32), equilibrium output equals
Yi = 
 2
i gixi = 
2i
1 i
i Ligi: (33)
The source of growth in this model is the expansion in the set of intermediates: from
(33), physical output is linear in the number of intermediates, implying Y^i = g^i. The
set of varieties is expanded by means of R&D activity pursued by competitive rms.
The innovation technology is
_gi = Di=& i; (34)
where Di is R&D expenditure and & i is the R&D cost, i.e. an inverse index of the
productivity of R&D investment. Free-entry conditions in the R&D business imply that
the value of an innovation equals the R&D cost, Vi = & i. The value of an innovation is in
turn equal to the value of the corresponding patent, which is sold to the monopolist who
will produce the new intermediate. In equilibrium, Vi equals the present-discounted
value of future monopoly prots, implying the standard no-arbitrage equation
ri = V^i + (i=Vi) = &^ i + (i=& i) ; (35)
where instantaneous prots i = (1  i) (xi=i) are constant from (32). The model is
closed by the aggregate constraint of the economy, which is derived by the individual
wealth constraint. Individual wealth is now represented by assets of domestic rms,
and aggregate wealth reads qiNi = giVi = gi& i. Substituting this relation in (9), and
using (34)-(35), it follows that aggregate output must equal the sum of aggregate
consumption, total expenditure in producing intermediates, and R&D investment,
Yi = Ci + gixi +Di; (36)
and the rate of varietiesexpansion can be written as
& ig^i =
 
1  2i


2i
1 i
i Li   (Ci=gi) : (37)
For the sake of exposition, the model is analyzed in two logical steps, beginning with
structural productivity gaps, and then implementing technological catching-up using
the technology absorption principle (Nelson and Phelps, 1966).
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Structural gaps. Assume that the R&D cost is constant in both countries, & i (t) = & i.
From (35), interest rates are constant over time,
ri = i=& i = (1  i)
1+i
1 i
i (Li=& i) ; (38)
and the model produces exactly the same results derived in section 3.1. Propositions
1 and 2 hold true,9 with structural gaps being now determined by di¤erences in R&D
costs, rather than di¤erences in the intensity of learning by-doing. In particular, if
country a exhibits a comparative advantage in R&D - that is, &a < &b all other things
being equal - it derives from (38) that the interest rate will be permanently lower in
country b.
Technological Catching-Up. In a one-good version of the present model, Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1997) describe the convergence process between a technological
leader - which produces original innovationsand displays a comparative advantage in
R&D - and a technological follower, which readapts the blueprints developed abroad
and catches-up with the leader by imitation. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) assume
that the cost of imitation is a function of the observed gap in the number of existing
intermediates, and show that economy b achieves the same growth rate of country a in
the long run, which implies interest rate equalization provided that input elasticities are
equal, a = b. Interest rate equalization is a general feature of catching-up models.
The cost of imitationfunction is a possible way to obtain this outcome, and is used
by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) to describe transitional dynamics in detail, and to
address a number of related topics. With respect to the issue of convergence, however,
results are essentially the same if we assume spillovers in R&D that directly a¤ect
the productivity of rms in the lagging country (Feenstra, 1996: sect.6.3), since this
mechanismmakes the respective rates of return converge in the long run - see Bretschger
and Steger (2004) and Smulders (2004). This is particularly relevant for the problem
at hand, since consumption dynamics are a¤ected by terms of trade and status desire,
and convergence must be modelled in a tractable way. In this regard, we formalize
spillovers in R&D according to the technology absorption function _i =  (   i),
where i indicates a generic country-specic technological parameter and  is the best
practice technology available at the world level. The absorption function, originally
used by Nelson and Phelps (1966), formalizes catching-up as an adjustment process
whereby technology in country i converges to the leading technology with a speed
of adjustment equal to  > 0 - also called absorptive capability(Abramovitz, 1986).
Empirical estimations of absorptive capability are presented in Hansson and Henrekson
(1994), and applications to international technology di¤usion are discussed in Rogers
9Since Ra and Rb are constant, Lemma 3 applies and p converges to a nite steady-state p. The
growth rate of the price index is constant in the long run, and Proposition 1 holds. From (12)-(13),
C^a and C^b are also constant in the long run, which implies balanced growth in both countries in the
long run since constraint (37) is compatible with intertemporal optimality conditions only if g^i = C^i.
Having obtained C^i = Y^i = g^i in the long run, expressions (14), (15) and (20) imply (27)-(28).
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(2003). In the present model, the absorption function is associated with the relevant
parameter of comparative advantage, the cost of R&D. Assume
_&b (t) =  (&a   &b (t)) ; &b (0) > &a; (39)
where &a is constant. Recalling that & i is an inverse index of the marginal productivity
of R&D rms in country i, expression (39) means that the R&D sector in the lagging
country increases its productive e¢ ciency over time (_&b < 0) by learning from the
technological leader. A concrete example of this process may be that of R&D sectors
that de-ingeneer components of nal goods produced abroad, readapting the resulting
know-how to develop components for domestic production. Alternatively, all the results
presented below can be obtained in the model of section 3.1, applying the absorption
principle to human knowledge hi - as originally suggested by Nelson and Phelps (1966).
Assuming that all other things be equal between the two countries, equation (39)
generates the basic result of catching-up models - that is, interest rate equalization:
from the no-arbitrage equation (35), ra is constant and given by (38), whereas the
interest rate in country b equals
rb (t) = &b (t)
 1

(1  b)
1+b
1 b
b Lb +  (&a   &b (t))

; (40)
where, by direct integration of (39), the time-path of R&D costs is
&b (t) = &a + (&b (0)  &a) e  t: (41)
Since &b approaches &a in the long run, technological catching-up absorbes the initial
comparative advantage for the status leader, and expressions (38) and (40) imply
lim
t!1
rb = (1  )
1+
1  (L=&a) = ra; (42)
where  = a = b and L = La = Lb. With respect to the assumption of identi-
cal parameters, three remarks can be made. First, La = Lb is required in view of
the inherent features of the model under study, which displays scale e¤ects in pro-
duction.10 Second, assuming uniform input shares is not necessarily inconsistent with
trade specialization, as long as the degree of di¤erentiation between produced goods
lies within a given range: empirical evidence suggests that, while national economies
exhibit various degrees of specialization, input shares do not exhibit great heterogene-
ity if compared to observed di¤erences in policies and institutions.11 Third, identical
parameters consititute the relevant benchmark for the present analysis, since it allows
10In general, scale e¤ects can be circumvented by assuming that the engine of growth is given by
rm-specic spillovers (Peretto and Smulders, 2004) and modelling convergence through international
R&D spillovers, as in Smulders (2004).
11See Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) and references quoted therein.
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us to investigate the consequences of status seeking in isolation from deviations merely
induced by asymmetric input shares.
From (42), technological absorption implies Ra (t) > Rb (t) during the transition,
which allows us to prove the following
Proposition 4 In the long run, interest-rate equalization implies divergence:  p and
 converge to steady-state values  p and 
 in the long run, terms-of-trade e¤ects are
strictly negative,
lim
t!1
p^ (t) =   (=) (   1)Ra < 0; (43)
and each country achieves a balanced growth path, implying the long-run growth di¤er-
ential
lim
t!1
(t) =   (=) (   1)Ra (   1) 6= 0: (44)
Proposition 4 shows that, in the presence of technological catching-up, any positive
degree of status desire generates a negative growth rate in the price index: all other
things being equal, consumption expenditures grow at higher rate in country b as a
consequence of status seeking, thereby inating the relative price of the good produced
by the status-leader. Expression (43) claries that price distortions persist even if
the two countries converge towards the same technological base. The implications for
growth di¤erentials are summarized in expression (44): for any positive degree of status
desire, the two economies diverge. This result is in stark contrast with the status-free
case,  = 0, where interest rate equalization implies the well-known convergence result,
limt!1 = 0.
4.2 The convergence paradox and switchover of growth lead-
ership
Comparing Propositions 2 and 4, a convergence paradoxemerges: in the presence
of status-seeking, technological catching-up implies divergence, whereas technological
independence admits convergence. This conclusion, nearly opposite to conventional
results, originates in the distortions induced by envy in terms of trade: on the one hand,
this e¤ect may compensate for structural gaps, yielding envy-induced convergence. On
the other hand, if structural gaps disappear, distorsions remain and envy drives market
shares away from stationary equilibria. This second case is particularly interesting
from the perspective of emerging economies. As noted in the Introduction, the present
analysis builds on the idea that agents living in emerging economies aim at achieving
consumption levels of more advanced countries. Hence, the scenario in which status-
seeking phenomena plausibly arise is one in which country a exhibits comparative
advantage in R&D at time zero, and is both status- and growth-leader in the short run.
This section shows that, under these assumptions, the model of section 4.1 generates
a switchover of growth leadership in favor of the initially lagging economy.
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Figure 1: Status-seeking interacts with technological catching-up determining a
switchover in growth leadership (left-side graphs). Ruling out envy, the two countries
converge (right-side graphs).
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Formally, the plausible scenariois obtained by means of two simple assumptions:
rst, there is a huge productivity gap at time zero, Ra  Rb (0), resulting from the
comparative advantage in R&D of the status leader (&a  &b (0)); second, traded
goods are substitutes,  > 1, so that the status-free growth di¤erential is in favor of
the economy displaying higher growth in physical productivity. For simplicity, further
assume  = 2: this is not necessary for the switchover to occur, but it greatly simplies
the analysis. In fact,  = 2 implies that  p = 0:25 at each instant (see Appendix), and
we can derive an explicit time path for terms-of-trade e¤ects at each point in time:
from (15) and (40), the only time-varying argument in p^ is the cost of R&D in country
b, which evolves according to (41). Hence, it is possible to re-write (15) as a function
of &b,
p^ (t) = 0 (&b (t)) = ~ [ra   rb (&b (t))  (=) (   1) (ra   )] ; (45)
where ~ = 2   (   1) [1 + (=) (0:75)] > 0 as in equation (24), and rb (&b (t)) is
the function implicitly dened by (40). From (45), if the initial di¤erence in R&D
productivity is su¢ ciently high, the term in square brackets is initially positive: at
t = 0, a large gap &b (0)   &a implies p^ (0) > 0 because the resulting di¤erential in
interest rates more than compensates for the e¤ects of envy (the last term in square
brackets). However, as time passes, the rst term declines monotonously, and there
exists a nite time at which the growth rate of the price index is zero (see Appendix):
t = ln
"
( +) (&b (0)  &a)
(1  ) 1+1 L &a
# 1
 
; (46)
where   ra   (=) (   1) (ra   ). At instant t the e¤ects of status seeking
exactly compensate for the existing gap in the rates of return from R&D. After time
t technology absorption continues, the interest rate gap vanishes and the growth rate
of p^ is strictly negative, approaching the long-run value derived in (43). A similar
time-path is followed by the di¤erential in physical-output growth rates, which obeys
the rule
y = g^a   g^b = L
 
& 1a   & 1b
  [(za=&a)  (zb=&b)] ; (47)
where L  (1  2) 21 L and zi  ci=gi. As before, the right-hand side of this
expression can be positive in the short run as long as &b   &a is large enough at time
zero, but it converges to a negative value in the long run: as shown in the Appendix,
lim
t!1
y (t) =  & 1a (zssa   zssb ) < 0: (48)
With  > 1, expression (48) implies that country b is growth leader in the long run:
due to balanced growth, we have  < 0 from (44). This implies that, if country a is
initially growth leader by virtue of initial conditions, a switchover in growth leadership
must occur during the transition.
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Since the transitional dynamics of  are jointly determined by (45) and (47), the
behavior of growth di¤erentials in the short-medium run must be checked numerically.
An example is given in Figure 1, which reports the time-paths of consumption growth
rates, terms-of-trade e¤ects and di¤erentials in output growth based on equations (45)
and (47). Parameter values are:  = 0:3,  = 1:5,  = 0:02,  = 0:3, L = 1, &a = 0:6
and &b (0) = 1:1. The model predicts y = c '  0:9% asymptotically - that is,
even a relatively low status desire,  = 0:3, is capable of generating a one-per-cent
gap in physical output growth rates in favor of the status-seeking country. The initial
gap in R&D costs is lled over time at rate of absorption  = 0:02. The switchover
in terms-of-trade e¤ects occurs at time t ' 120, whereas the switchover in physical
output growth gaps occurs around t = 95. Transitional e¤ects produce a switchover
in the overall growth di¤erential around t = 50, after which  approaches its long-run
equilibrium value, (   1) p^ '  0:45%. Clearly, higher degrees of status desire would
produce more drastic growth di¤erentials - see (44).
The general e¤ects of envy can be easily assessed by comparing the time-paths
of the relevant varibales with those obtained without status-seeking, also reported in
Figure 1. Without envy, country a is growth leader during the whole transition, and
countries converge in growth rates by virtue of technological catching-up, in line with
established results. In the presence of status seeking, instead, country a remains status-
and growth-leader only for a nite interval: the interaction between envy and technol-
ogy absorption produces growth equalization in nite time; subsequently, country b
overshoots the convergence goal, and long-run growth di¤erentials turn in favor of the
initially lagging economy, by virtue of the terms-of-trade e¤ects generated by envy.
4.3 Remarks and connections with the literature
Nowadays, preferences are likely to be interdependent among trading countries. Un-
doubtedly, one aspect of modern globalization is that information, advertising, tourism,
and migration, have contributed to creating a foreign benchmark, on the basis of which
individuals in many countries evaluate their relative position (Sklair, 1991; James,
2000). While the view that status seeking has already crossed the borders is discussed
in development studies, and advocated by sociologists, a formal treatment of interna-
tional status seeking in a general equilibrium perspective is, to my knowledge, absent
in the literature.12 In particular, the macroeconomic implications of transboundary
12The idea that preferences are interdependent at the international level was considered by Nurkse
(1957), who argued that knowledge of new consumption patterns widens the horizon of desires, thereby
giving rise to an international demonstration e¤ect. Our analysis does not represent, however,
a formalization of the demonstration e¤ect: in Nurkse (1957), preference interdependence means
that foreign goods open consumerseyes to previously unrecognized possibilities, thereby leading to
endogenous imitation on the production side. In this paper, instead, we follow the Veblenian approach
in postulating that preference interdependence derives from envy, and therefore generates Catching-
Up With The Joneses phenomena operating at the international level. Envy was explicitly ruled
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envy have not been investigated at the theoretical level, and our results may be related
to those found in the literature on intra-national status seeking and inter-personal
jealousy. In a closed and static economy, Dupor and Liu (2003) show that the sym-
metric equilibrium among jealous private agents implies over-consumption; similarly,
but in a dynamic setting, Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) nd positive growth e¤ects
of outward-looking preferences in the Ramsey model, and Alonso-Carrera et al. (2004)
show that Catching-Up with the Jonesesimplies overaccumulation in the AK model.
The tendency to overconsume is also present in our model, but it has quite di¤erent
implications. In a two-country world, higher consumption expenditures in country b
translate into increased relative prices for goods produced abroad. The distortion in
price dynamics introduces a wedge between terms-of-trade e¤ects and interest rate
di¤erentials, generating the convergence paradoxand possible switchovers in growth
leadership. Similar connections and conceptual di¤erences may be traced with respect
to the literature where status seeking is modelled according to the relative wealth ap-
proach (Corneo and Jeanne, 1997; Futagami and Shibata, 1998; Fisher, 2005; Fisher
and Hof, 2005). In this framework, the benchmark term depends on the gap between
individual and average per capita asset holdings (instead of consumption levels), and
this type of preferences may also induce equilibria with overconsumption. Fisher (2005)
and Fisher and Hof (2005) apply the relative wealth approach to open-economy mod-
els, but again assume intra-national status seeking: both papers consider a small-open
economy where the benchmark level is determined within the country, and address
di¤erent issues with respect to those tackled here.13
With respect to the literature on trade and growth, the peculiarity of the model
is obviously the introduction of transboundary envy. From a broader perspective, the
analysis emphasizes the role of terms of trade, which is sometimes neglected in growth
models. Empirical evidence suggests that terms-of-trade e¤ects actually matter for
growth and are "quantitatively important in understanding the observed patterns of
cross-country income di¤erences" (Acemoglu and Ventura, 2002: p.681). In this re-
gard, the convergence paradox claries that interest rate equalization is not su¢ cient
to ensure convergence once that terms-of-trade e¤ects play an active role: as long
as consumption externalities a¤ect price dynamics, market shares will necessarily re-
ect existing distortions. This point also adds to the conclusions of the literature on
outward-looking preferences in closed-economies: according to Alvarez-Cuadrado et al.
out by Nurkse as part of the mechanism giving rise to preference interdependence and demonstration
e¤ects (ibid. p. 61).
13Fisher (2005) and Fisher and Hof (2005) study the e¤ects of relative-wealth spillovers in a small
open economy with international capital mobility and a single homogeneous nal good. Fisher and
Hof (2005) focus on the role of such preferences in driving accumulation rates when the interest rate
di¤ers from the utility discount rate, and show that relative-wealth preferences magnify the e¤ects
of improvements in productivity on long-run consumption. Fisher (2005) shows that relative-wealth
preferences may imply non-monotonic dynamics for the current account, due to the interplay between
wealth spillovers and installation costs.
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(2004), the Catching-Up with the Jonesphenomenon may account for non-linearities
observed in the development paths of real-world economies. The present analysis sug-
gests that similar consumption externalities a¤ect the development path via terms-of-
trade e¤ects, and through this channel, the link between trade and growth. The idea
that status spillovers may overboost consumption rates appears plausible with special
regard to big countries, such as India and China, that are rapidly catching-up in the
stages of economic development. Tackling this issue at the empirical level seems an
interesting topic for applied research.
A nal remark relates to the interpretation of the model. The status-seeking coun-
try in the present analysis should not be interpreted as an under-developed economy,
for three main reasons. First, the assumption of similar technologies - i.e. comparable
production functions - would become critical in this regard. Second, a reasonable social
benchmark for consumers in poor countries is represented by owning specic material
foreign goods. In this context, status-signalling commodities generate the "discrimina-
tion in favor of visible consumption" (Veblen, 1899: p.112), which can be formalized at
the microeconomic level along the lines of the theory of positional goods - see Van Kem-
pen (2003). In this context, the role of international envy in the growth process may be
quite di¤erent, and itself part of the explanations for poverty persistence: since acquir-
ing purely positional goods results in waste and is collectively self-defeating (Hirsch,
1976), conspicuous consumption in countries lacking infrastructures may conne the
economy in poverty traps by crowding-out resources from technology-developing sec-
tors. For all these reasons, tackling the issue of trade between a­ uent societies and
under-developed countries would require a di¤erent model, not only as regards techno-
logical assumptions, but also with respect to preference specications.
5 Conclusion
A central element of Veblens theory of conspicuous consumption is the observation
that individual behavior is driven by the subjective perception of social status. One
aspect of modern globalization is that information, advertising, tourism, and migration,
have contributed to creating a foreign benchmark on the basis of which individuals in
many countries evaluate their relative position. While it is plausible that consumers in
emerging economies aim at achieving consumption levels of more advanced countries,
this type of Catching-Up With The Jonesesbehavior has not been analyzed as far
as international externalities are concerned. This paper analyzed the consequences of
international status seeking in a two-country model of trade and endogenous growth,
with asymmetric technologies and full specialization. In this framework, envy distorts
terms of trade because faster growth of consumption expenditures in the status-seeking
economy inates the relative price of the good produced by the status-leader country.
The main results are as follows. First, the e¤ects of status seeking may compensate for
structural gaps in physical productivity growth, leading to convergence induced by pref-
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erences, or even revert the sign of the growth di¤erential between the two economies.
Second, in the presence of technological catching-up, which implies interest-rate equal-
ization, the two countries diverge since the distortions generated by envy induce a
permanent wedge between the respective growth rates. In particular, the interaction
between envy and technological catching-up produces a switchover of growth leader-
ship: when the advanced economy is both status- and technology-leader in the short
run, convergence in interest rates - e.g. due to R&D spillovers - does not eliminate
distortions induced by envy, and the initially lagging economy becomes growth leader
in the long run for any positive degree of status desire.
The literature on intra-national status seeking suggests that consumption external-
ities a¤ect long-run capital accumulation (Carrol et al. 1997; Alonso-Carrera et al.
2004; Liu and Turnovsky, 2005) and provide a reasonable explanation for the observed
non-linearities that characterize the development path of many economies (Alvarez-
Cuadrado et al. 2004). Our results imply that international consumption externalities
may a¤ect the development path of big open economies via terms-of-trade e¤ects and,
through this channel, modify the link between trade and growth. A question that natu-
rally arises is whether these theoretical results can be conrmed by empirical evidence.
In particular, the idea that international status seeking may overboost consumption
growth rates appears plausible with special regard to big countries that are rapidly
catching-up in the stages of economic development, such as India and China. Ad-
dressing this issue at the empirical level seems an interesting topic for future research,
and would shed more light on the scope and relevance of consumption externalities in
todays globalized world.
Appendix
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. See Proof of Lemma 3 below.
Proof of Lemma 3. The rst part of Lemma 3 can be restated as follows. Dene
Rx  Ra  Rb   (=) (   1)Ra; (A1)
and suppose that, for all t 2 [t0;1) with t0  0, we have either Rx (t) > 0 or Rx (t) <
0. Then,  p eventually converges to
 p = lim
t!1
 p (t) =

0 if ( > 1; Rx (t) < 0) or ( < 1; Rx (t) > 0)
(1=2)

 1 if ( > 1; Rx (t) > 0) or ( < 1,Rx (t) < 0)
:
(A2)
Expression (A2) is proved as follows. Di¤erentiating  with respect to p from (7) yields
 p = (1=2)

 1
 
1 + p1 
 2 
 1 > 0 (A3)
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which implies that  p is constant and equal to 0:25 when  = 2. When  6= 2, expression
(A3) implies
 p
(1=2)

 1
=
"
1 +
1
p 1
 2
 1
# 1
=

1 +
1
p 1
 2 
 1
=
h 
1 + p1 
 2 
1 
i 1
: (A4)
First, suppose Rx (t) < 0, which implies p^ (t) < 0 and therefore p (t) ! 0 as t ! 1.
In this case: if  > 2, the second term in (A4) implies  p = 0; if 1 <  < 2, the third
term in (A4) implies  p = 0; if  < 1, the fourth term in (A4) implies 

p = (1=2)

 1 .
Second, suppose Rx (t) > 0, which implies p^ (t) > 0 and therefore p (t)!1 as t!1.
In this case: if  > 2, the second term in (A4) implies  p = (1=2)

 1 ; if 1 <  < 2,
the third term in (A4) implies  p = (1=2)

 1 ; if  < 1, the fourth term in (A4) implies
 p = 0. All these results are gathered in expression (A2). In view of the fact that  p
converges to a nite steady-state in the long run, expression (15) implies that:
p^ (t) =
Rx (t)
2   (   1) [1 + (=) (0:75)] for all t 2 [0;1) if  = 2; (A5)
lim
t!1
p^ (t) =
limt!1Rx (t)
   (   1) 1 + (=)  1   p if  6= 2 (A6)
in any model where, for all t 2 [t0;1) with t0  0, we have either Rx (t) > 0 or
Rx (t) < 0. In addition, if both countries converge to balanced growth, Ra and Rb
are constant in the long run, implying that p^ and c = y are constant at least
asymptotically. From (20), this implies
lim
t!1
(t) = (   1) limRx (t)
   (   1) 1 + (=)  1   p : (A7)
Hence, from (A1), we can dene the critical level of status desire as
 =


   1

lim
t!1

Ra (t) Rb (t)
Ra (t)

; (A8)
¨ and obtain a generalized Proposition 2: if limt!1Ra (t) is strictly greater than
limt!1Rb (t), there exists a critical level of status desire (A8) such that: (i) if  = 
then limt!1(t) = 0; (ii) if  > , the sign of the long-run growth di¤erential is
overturned by envy.
In the model with learning-by-doing of section 3.1, Ra and Rb are constant over the
whole time-horizon, so that expressions (A5)-(A6) reduce to (24)-(25), which proves
Proposition 1. Similarly, constant interest rates allow us to rewrite (A7) as (28), and
obtain Proposition 2 by rewriting (A8) as (30).
Derivation of (47). Dividing both sides of (37) by & i
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yields
g^i =
 
L  zi

& 1i : (A9)
where we have dened L  (1  2) 21 L and zi  Ci=gi. Taking the di¤erence
between g^a and g^b, and recalling that g^i = Y^i, we obtain (47). By denition, the
growth rate of zi equals c^i   g^i. Using (A9) we can write
z^i = c^i   & 1i
 
L  za

; (A10)
Asymptotic balanced growth implies that za and zb converge to steady-state levels in
the long run: from (A10),
lim
t!1
za (t) = z
ss
a =
L  &ac^ssa and lim
t!1
zb (t) = z
ss
b =
L  &ac^ssb ; (A11)
where we have used limt!1 &b (t) = &a from (41). From (43), consumption expenditure
grows at higher rate in country b in the long run, and c^ssb > c^
ss
a implies z
ss
a > z
ss
b . As
a consequence, the limit of expression (47) as time goes to innity is strictly negative
and equals (48).
Proof of Proposition 4. From (42), technological absorption implies Ra (t) >
Rb (t) during the whole transition, withRa (t) Rb (t) decreasing monotonically towards
zero. As a consequence, the sign of Rx - as dened in (A1) - falls in one of the following
cases: rst, Rx is negative from t = 0 onwards; second, Rx is initially positive but, due
to the progressive reduction in the interest rate gap, it turns negative in nite time and
remains negative thereafter. In either case, there exists an instant t0  0 such that, for
all t 2 [t0;1), we have either Rx (t) > 0 or Rx (t) < 0 (when Rx (0) < 0, then t0 = 0;
when Rx (0) > 0, then t0 = t > 0 where t is nite and is given by expression (46)
- see below). Hence, Lemma 3 applies and  p converges to a nite steady-state given
by (A2). Setting limt!1Rb (t) = Ra and limt!1  p (t) =  p in (15) gives expression
(43). Moreover, with Ra = Rb and p^ and  p asymptotically stationary, equations (12)-
(13) imply a constant growth rate in consumption expenditures in both countries. In
order to satisfy constraints (37), long-run equilibria feature balanced growth in both
economies, and hence C^i = Y^i = g^i. As a consequence, the long-run growth di¤erential
is given by (20), and reduces to (44) due to interest rate equalization.
Derivation of (46). The term in square brackets in (45) is zero when
rb (&b (t)) = ra   (=) (   1) (ra   ) : (A12)
From (40) and (41), the interest rate in country b equals
rb (t) =
(1  b)
1+b
1 b
b Lb    (&b (0)  &a) e  t
&a + (&b (0)  &a) e  t : (A13)
Plugging (A13) in (A12), and dening   ra   (=) (   1) (ra   ) we can solve
the resulting expression for the time index by taking logarithms, obtaining (46). As
25
intuitive, the logarithm is well-dened if &b (0)  &a is large enough, since t > 0 exists
only if p^ is strictly positive at time zero by virtue of a huge gap in the rates of return
from R&D.
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